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The 2014 mid-term election that put 
Republicans in control of Congress 
reduced any chance of federal legislative 
action to limit greenhouse gases such as 
carbon dioxide from electric power plants. 
However, the executive branch already has 
authority from the U.S. Supreme Court to 
limit emissions under the Clean Air Act.1 
In June 2014, the Obama Administration 
issued its proposed Clean Power Plan, 
which sets a specific limit on emissions 
for each state and then allows each state to 
decide how to meet its target. Comments 
are invited on this plan, and President 
Obama can modify the executive order 
before it is issued in June of 2015. 
The U.S. Clean Power Plan uses a formula 
to determine the target for each state, 
expressed as a maximum emission rate 
per unit of electricity, but it provides states 
with flexibility regarding how to meet that 
target.2 It even allows states to convert that 
emission rate target to an absolute quantity 
of emissions and then to sell permits for 
that many tons of carbon dioxide. Any state 
that chooses to comply with the federal 
mandate by selling permits can collect 
revenue for the state, and this revenue 
1See Liptak, Adam. (June 23, 2014). Justices 
Uphold Emission Limits on Big Industry. The New 
York Times. Available at http://www.nytimes.
com/2014/06/24/us/justices-with-limits-let-epa-curb-
power-plant-gases.html
2See Davenport, Carol and Peter Baker. (June 2, 2014). 
Taking a Page from Health Care Act, Obama Climate 




can be used for additional spending, to 
cut other taxes, or to reduce the projected 
budget deficit. Indeed, many states since 
the Great Recession are still facing major 
deficit projections. 
This federal mandate provides an 
opportunity for states like Illinois to 
address some significant budget problems. 
In Illinois, for example, projections of the 
deficit under current law increase from $1 
billion in FY2014 to $14 billion in FY2025.3 
Our purpose here is to calculate the fraction 
of several states’ projected future deficits 
that can be offset by collecting their own 
permit revenue. 
The U.S. Clean Power Plan
At a cost of $7.4 to $8.8 billion in 2030, the 
U.S. EPA believes that its proposed Clean 
Power Plan will achieve “climate and health 
benefits worth an estimated $55 billion to 
$93 billion in 2030, including avoiding 2,700 
to 6,600 premature deaths and 140,000 to 
150,000 asthma attacks in children.”4 This 
proposed federal mandate would require 
3Dye, Richard, Nancy Hudspeth and David 
Merriman. (2014). Peering Over Illinois’ Fiscal 
Cliff: New Projections from IGPA’s Fiscal Futures 
Model. The Illinois Report, Institute of Government 
and Public Affairs, pp. 12-21. Available at 
http://igpa.uillinois.edu/system/files/IR2014D_
PeeringOverIllinoisFiscalCliff.pdf
4United States Environmental Protection Agency. 
(Last updated on June 13, 2014). Fact Sheet: Clean 






each state to come up with their own plan to reduce emission 
rates (in tons of CO2 per megawatt hour) by an average of 
30 percent from 2005 levels, starting in 2020 and hitting that 
target by 2030. The plan suggests four building blocks for 
state plans: (1) make coal-fired power plants more efficient; 
(2) switch from coal to natural gas generation with lower 
CO2 emissions; (3) expand renewable generating capacity; 
and (4) reduce electricity demand altogether.
The EPA tries to incorporate current and projected 
technological developments to determine how much 
emission rate reduction is possible in each state by each of 
the four building blocks. It then uses a formula to calculate 
a different target for each state. It allows more CO2 per 
megawatt hour for states that currently make heavy use 
of carbon-intensive coal, but it also requires them to make 
larger absolute reductions. Other states, such as those in the 
Pacific Northwest that use more hydro-power, would reduce 
emissions by a smaller absolute amount but still by a large 
percentage. But states do not need to follow the formula – 
each state can make its own choices about how to comply 
with its overall assigned target for CO2 per megawatt hour 
(CO2/Mwh).
Despite the future projected health benefits, this federal 
mandate would require states to incur compliance costs, and 
would therefore seem to make state budget problems even 
worse. However, the proposal allows any state to translate 
its emission rate requirement into a tonnage level and then 
sell permits under a cap-and-trade program. Firms would 
need a permit to emit each ton of CO2, so the fixed number 
of permits is the “cap” on emissions, and firms can “trade” 
those permits. The price of a permit discourages emissions, 
just like a tax on emissions. The U.S. plan encourages use of 
such market mechanisms, which “have demonstrated that 
compliance with environmental programs can be monetized 
such that it is factored into power sector economic decision 
making in ways that reduce the cost of controlling pollution” 
(U.S. EPA 2014b, p. 24).5
The federal government was not able to enact its own carbon 
tax or permit price to reduce emissions and raise revenue, 
so it effectively bequeaths that new revenue opportunity to 
the states.
States could already enact cap-and-trade to raise revenue, 
so one might wonder why we say the Clean Power Plan is a 
“new” revenue opportunity. Indeed, California’s cap-and-
5United States Environmental Protection Agency. (June 18, 2014). Carbon 
Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric 
Utility Generating Units. Available at https://www.federalregister.gov/
articles/2014/06/18/2014-13726/carbon-pollution-emission-guidelines-
for-existing-stationary-sources-electric-utility-generating. Much research 
demonstrates the economic efficiency of using a price on emissions to 
reduce emissions (for example, Burtraw, Dallas, Josh Linn, Karen Palmer 
and Anthony Paul. (2014). The Costs and Consequences of Clean Air Act 
Regulation of CO2 from Power Plants. American Economic Review: Papers 
and Proceedings, May, 104(5): 557-62.) It efficiently reduces emissions per 
unit of output, and it reduces output (by raising output price). In contrast, 
a restriction on CO2 per unit of output provides some incentive to increase 
output.
trade program was enacted in 2006 and is already raising 
revenue for the state.6 Perhaps to achieve political buy-
in from diverse interests, California found it necessary to 
hand out 90 percent of the permits to existing polluters in 
the initial years.7 In contrast, this new federal plan would 
require each state to enact a plan, which may reduce the need 
to purchase political acquiescence from polluters. We argue 
that a federal mandate would shift the political economy of 
state action, making it easier for a state to hit two birds with 
one stone: satisfy the federal mandate and at the same time 
raise revenue at minimum cost that can be used to cut the 
deficit or to reduce state income taxes.8 
Current Budget Problems
This opportunity for state revenue is important, as 
emphasized by the dire findings in the Final Report of the 
State Budget Crisis Task Force released in January 2014 by Co-
Chairs Richard Ravitch (former Lt. Governor of New York) 
and Paul A. Volcker (former Chairman of the U.S. Federal 
Reserve Board).9 The report documents high existing 
state deficits, underfunded liabilities, and poor budgeting 
methods.10 However, it does not make projections of future 
deficits. Here, we provide further analysis of future deficits 
for the six large states that feature prominently as case 
studies in the Report of the State Budget Crisis Task Force, 
namely: California, Illinois, New Jersey, New York, Texas, 
and Virginia.
No single source provides complete and comparable data 
on state budget projections. Many state constitutions require 
6Center for Climate and Energy Solutions. California Cap and Trade 
Brief. Available at http://www.c2es.org/us-states-regions/key-legislation/
california-cap-trade. “Although a significant number of emission 
allowances will be freely allocated in California’s program, many will also 
be sold at auction. The first year of auctions generated over $525 million in 
revenue for the state [but] auction revenue [will] rise over time.”
7Environmental Defense Fund. (March 2014). AB 32 Cap-and-Trade 
Auctions Frequently Asked Questions. Available at http://www.edf.org/
sites/default/files/content/cap_and_trade_auction_faq_march_2014_0.pdf. 
Goulder, Lawrence H. (2013). Markets for Pollution Allowances: What 
Are the (New) Lessons? Journal of Economic Perspectives, 27(1), Winter: 
87–102 indicates that California is “moving toward auctioning more than 
half of their allowances” (p. 97).
8This point relates to a huge literature on the “double dividend,” the idea 
that a pollution tax could both improve the environment and improve the 
economic efficiency of the tax system. See Goulder, Lawrence H. (1995). 
Environmental Taxation and the ‘Double Dividend’: A Reader’s Guide. 
International Tax and Public Finance, 2(2): 157–83.). Also, Fullerton and 
Metcalf show that permits create profits for firms if handed out for free, 
so government can capture those profits as revenue without any loss in 
economic efficiency. See Fullerton, Don, and Gilbert E. Metcalf (2001). 
Environmental Controls, Scarcity Rents, and Pre-existing Distortions. 
Journal of Public Economics 80(2): 249–67.
9The State Budget Crisis Taskforce. (January 2014). Final Report. Available 
at http://www.statebudgetcrisis.org/wpcms/wp-content/images/SBCTF_
FINALREPORT.pdf
10“Medicaid spending growth is crowding out other needs; federal deficit 
reduction threatens state economies and budgets; underfunded retirement 
promises create risks for future budgets; narrow, eroding tax bases and 
volatile tax revenues undermine state finances; local government fiscal 
stress poses challenges for states; [and] state budget laws and practices 
hinder fiscal stability and mask imbalances” (State Budget Crisis Task 
Force, 2014, p.7).
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a balanced budget, which they define in different ways. For 
example, a state’s official budget may or may not include the 
revenue and spending associated with a highway trust fund, 
a state pension fund, or any other special purpose fund with 
its own source of revenue. Some states project a balanced 
budget, as required, even if the state is in a difficult financial 
position. One state may show a balanced budget that 
excludes projected pension underfunding, while another 
state in the exact same situation may show a budget deficit 
that accounts for pensions. As a result, different state budgets 
are generally not directly comparable. For these reasons, we 
study data from each state to find its own projected budget 
surplus or deficit. The purpose is not to compare states, but 
to find the extent to which each state’s own future budget 
deficit projection can be covered by the use of revenue from 
a carbon tax or from sale of CO2 emission permits.
Table 1 shows our initial calculations, while an appendix 
shows sources of data and some of the differences between 
state budget definitions. The first panel of the table shows 
each state’s own budget deficit projections in millions of 
nominal dollars, and the second panel shows those amounts 
per capita. California and Texas already project surpluses at 
least through 2016. Still, those two states could use cap-and-
trade revenue to cut other distorting taxes, possibly reducing 
the economic costs of taxation. The future per capita deficit 
is only about $140 in New York and approaches $200 in New 
Jersey. Illinois temporarily increased its personal income tax 
rate from 3 percent to 5 percent, but that rate increase expires 
in 2015. Thus, under current law, the projected annual 
deficit in Illinois is $4.5 billion by 2017 ($349 per capita). The 
annual deficit in Virginia is a bit smaller in absolute terms 
($4.2 billion), but it’s $494 per person.
Cap-and-Trade as a Revenue Opportunity
Whatever one thinks about U.S. climate policy, the state of 
Illinois will have to comply with any federal mandate. If 
the executive order in 2015 resembles the proposal released 
in 2014, as expected, then Illinois could comply by either 
of two approaches: (a) issue its own mandates to electric 
power plants, or (b) set up a permit system, sell permits to 
electricity generators, collect revenue, and reduce projected 
state deficits. By using a pollution tax or cap-and-trade 
permit system, the state leaves choices of specific emission 
reduction methods entirely to the private sector. Assuming 
firms minimize the cost of reducing emissions, this approach 
also minimizes the total cost of reducing emissions.
In Table 2 (page 5), we employ a U.S. EPA analysis of 
this plan, including their projection of the CO2 emission 
level in each state under compliance with this proposal in 
2020. We then calculate the possible revenue that could be 
collected using a carbon tax or the sale of permits.11 For all 
of the reasons documented in our appendix, the price of a 
permit to emit one ton of CO2 is likely to be about $20. We 
use that estimate for our main calculations in the table, but 
we acknowledge that the future price of a permit in Illinois 
might be higher or lower. If the price is only $10 or $30 per 
ton, then the future revenue would be 50 percent less or 50 
percent more than shown in our table.
Compared to the other states here, Illinois currently 
generates more of its electricity from coal- fired power plants, 
so the EPA formula allows an emission rate of 1,366 lbs CO2/
Mwh. (The allowed emission rate for California is 556, New 
11United States Environmental Protection Agency. (Last updated June 25, 
2014). EPA Analysis of the Proposed Clean Power Plan. Option 1 – State. 
Available at http://www.epa.gov/airmarkets/powersectormodeling/











Total Surplus, or Negative for Deficit (in millions of nominal dollars)
Californiaa 234.0 2,443.0 5,624.0 5,600.0 8,200.0
Illinoisb 924.0 458.0 -1,901.0 -4,111.0 -4,576.0
New Jerseyc -974.0 -572.3 -706.6 -1,873.0  n/a
New Yorkd 80.0 -134.0 -2,145.0 -2,700.0 -2,743.0
Texase 828.3 3,653.1 416.1 5,283.2  n/a
Virginiaf -1,219.0 -6,725.4 -2,359.7 -5,028.9 -4,224.5
Per Capita Surplus, or Negative for Deficit (in nominal dollars per person)g
California 6.16 63.73 143.40 139.57 202.31
Illinois 71.80 35.55 -146.35 -313.88 -348.65
New Jersey -109.83 -64.31 -77.85 -202.36  n/a
New York 4.09 -6.82 -109.45 -138.13 -140.29
Texas 31.78 138.12 15.69 198.72  n/a
Virginia -148.90 -814.18 -282.16 -593.95 -493.80
Table 1: Annual State Operating Surplus (or Negative for Deficit)
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Jersey is 647, New York is 635, Texas is 853, and Virginia 
is 884.) Thus, while Illinois would have to make cuts from 
its current high emission level, it is still allowed relatively 
large emissions per capita. We focus on annual revenue and 
deficit reduction in 2016/17, as shown in Table 2, but later 
years’ revenue could be even higher with economic growth.
In 2016/17, if its carbon tax or permit price were $20/ton, 
Illinois could collect revenue equal to $114 per capita, or 33 
percent of its projected budget deficit. At $30/ton, it could 
cover 49 percent. Potential revenue in New York is only $20 
per capita, and in New Jersey it is $16 per capita. Virginia 
could collect a larger $35 per capita per year, but that revenue 
is a small percentage of Virginia’s huge deficit.
While these numbers are obviously very preliminary, and 
not comprehensive, they certainly illustrate the significant 
size of potential revenue for any state that complies with the 
new federal mandate by introducing a carbon tax. Similarly, 
any state could introduce a cap-and-trade plan for carbon 
dioxide emissions permits where the state sells the permits. 
Whereas the handout of permits would provide significant 
profits to firms, the sale of permits can enable the state to 
reduce a substantial fraction of its looming fiscal deficit.
Some Analysis and Discussion 
Here, we provide some further analysis of other 
considerations, caveats, and limitations of these illustrative 
calculations.
First, we note that this revenue opportunity is not the same 
as “free money” to the states. It would impose costs on state 
residents and taxpayers. The use of a market mechanism (like 
a carbon tax or cap and trade) can be expected to minimize 
the total economic costs of achieving the required emissions 
reduction, and we argue that it will provide revenue to 
the state in the most efficient manner possible. But it is 
indeed a transfer from taxpayers to the state. The remaining 
questions are whether the state needs the money, whether 
it can reduce its budget deficit via spending reductions or 
other means, and what it should do with the money if it does 
tax emissions or sell permits.
Second, states may be compelled to use carbon tax or permit 
revenue for particular purposes other than for general 
revenue or to reduce deficits. Many environmental groups 
and other observers think it logical to earmark environmental 
tax revenue for environmental purposes such as energy 
efficiency programs – even though a pollution price or tax 
addresses the pollution problem efficiently and completely 
without specifying use of the revenue. If the state legislature 
feels compelled to use permit revenue for environmental 
programs, then that revenue is not available for deficit 
reduction.
Third, any climate policy has distributional effects from 
changing output prices, wage rates, and profits of firms.12 
Many argue that the net effects are regressive, because 
such policies raise the price of energy-intensive goods like 
electricity that constitute a high fraction of low-income 
family spending. While any approach used by Illinois 
to comply with the federal mandate would have similar 
effects on electricity prices, a cap-and-trade policy at least 
would allow the state to use some of the revenue to help 
low-income families offset those higher electricity costs. The 
Waxman-Markey cap-and-trade bill that passed the U.S. 
House of Representatives in 2009 earmarked 30 percent of 
permits to be used by Local Distribution Companies (LDCs) 
to reduce electricity bills.13 
Fourth, more generally, any number of lobbies can think 
of other uses for carbon tax or permit revenue, so states 
will undoubtedly have trouble preserving all carbon 
revenue for use in reducing state budget deficits or cutting 
personal income tax rates. And, of course, new state CO2 
emissions policies may generate non-trivial administrative, 
monitoring, and enforcement costs.
Fifth, while an increase in the state income tax would 
place burdens on Illinois taxpayers, a state carbon pricing 
system could place most of its burden on investors outside 
12Bento, Antonio M. (2013). Equity Impacts of Environmental Policy. 
Annual Review of Resource Economics, 5: 181–96.
13United States Environmental Protection Agency. (May 17, 2009). Ways in 
Which Revisions to the American Clean Energy and Security Act Change 
the Projected Economic Impacts of the Bill. Available at http://www.
epa.gov/climatechange/Downloads/EPAactivities/EPAMemoonHR2454.
pdf. It gave permit revenue to LDC’s to reduce the impact of prices 
on ratepayers, but the lower electricity price reduces the efficiency of 
emission reduction. Similarly, the new U.S. plan would require each state 
to reduce its emissions rate per Mwh, which reduces the incentive to cut 
output. States are allowed to convert that rate into a tonnage cap, and sell 
permits, which is more efficient because it both reduces emissions per 







Per Capita Cap-and-Trade Revenue at $20/ton 
(nominal dollars per person)
Californiaa California budget already includes existing 
cap-and-trade policy
Illinois 115.05 114.11 113.86
New Jersey 16.87 16.54 16.47
New York 20.04 20.09 20.09
Texas 119.10 118.79 117.04
Virginia 36.43 35.98 35.61
Percentage Reduction in Deficit from Cap-and-Trade Revenue
Illinois -78.6% -36.4% -32.7%
New Jersey -21.7% -8.2%  n/a
New York -18.3% -14.5% -14.3%
Virginia -12.9% -6.1% -7.2%
Table 2: Annual State Operating Surplus (or Negative 
for Deficit) with Revenue from a Carbon Tax or Cap-and-
Trade Price of $20/ton of CO2 
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of Illinois. Wholesale markets determine electricity prices, 
so rates depend on the cost of production at the last power 
plant that comes online. In Illinois, carbon-intensive, coal-
fired power plants are used earlier in the dispatch order, 
while low-carbon natural gas plants are the last ones to come 
online and effectively set the price. Thus, a cap-and-trade 
program would lead to a relatively small cost increase at the 
natural gas plants that set the electricity price, so the new 
market price of electricity may be too low to cover costs at 
carbon-intensive, coal-fired plants. Seventeen of the 20 coal-
fired power plants in Illinois with annual emissions above 
the 25,000 MTCO2 threshold are owned by publicly traded 
companies. Further, those 17 plants account for 62 percent of 
annual emissions from sources above the reporting threshold 
in Illinois. As a result, the nationwide stockholders of those 
companies may suffer a loss.
Another potential distributional effect could be on the 
wages and job security of workers at electric utilities and 
coal mines. But the economic burden via that path is also 
probably small. Power plants are long term investments 
that are difficult to replace in the short run. A cap-and-trade 
program might encourage a somewhat earlier retirement of 
coal-fired power plants and their replacement by gas-fired 
power plants. Workers can gradually move from old to new 
generation facilities. However, Illinois could use some of 
the permit revenue to create a program to retrain displaced 
miners if that industry is hit hard by the cap-and-trade 
program.
Finally, if higher production costs cannot be passed on 
to consumers via higher electricity prices or to workers 
via lower wages, the result is reduced profits. Reduced 
profitability lowers the value of a business and the stock 
price of publicly traded companies. Large companies have 
many stockholders around the world, and they may have 
well-paid lobbyists operating in Illinois, but only a small 
fraction of their owners live in Illinois. •
The Institute of Government and Public Affairs (IGPA) is a public policy research organization at the University of Illinois. IGPA’s 
mission is to improve public policy and government performance by: producing and distributing cutting-edge research and 
analysis, engaging the public in dialogue and education, and providing practical assistance in decision making to government 
and policymakers. The institute’s work not only advances knowledge, but also provides real solutions for the state’s most difficult 
challenges. 
To learn more, visit igpa.uillinois.edu.
IGPA’s Climate Change Policy Initiative is led by University of Illinois at Urbana Champaign finance scholars Don Fullerton and 
Julian Reif. The initiative seeks to understand how public policy can protect people from the effects of climate change in Illinois. 
Hotter temperatures will require more power for air conditioning, and greater weather volatility will mean increased numbers of 
droughts, floods, and storm damage. Beyond these consequences, Illinois will also be greatly affected by the interactions between 
uncertain water supplies and energy needs. The Climate Change Policy Initiative will evaluate forward-thinking public policies 
that can help protect Illinois’s productivity, health, and future economic welfare.
Contact Don Fullerton, dfullert@illinois.edu or Julian Reif, jreif@illinois.edu, to learn more about the initiative.
7
Table 1 Appendix
Some states report budget numbers in calendar years, while 
others use various fiscal year configurations. If calendar 
year is used, then the first year in the heading applies as the 
budget year; “n/a” indicates budget data not available from 
current sources. 
a Source: “The 2014-15 Budget: California’s Fiscal Outlook,” 
Figure 1 (General Fund and Education Protection Account 
Combined).
b Source: “Governor’s Office of Management and Budget 
2014 Three Year Projection” (General Funds only).
c Source: “The Governor’s FY 2015 Budget Summary,” 
Schedules 1 & 4 (General Budget Items only).
d Source: “Report on the State Fiscal Year 2013-14 Enacted 
Budget and Financial Plan, July 2013,” Figure 7 (General 
Fund and State Operating Funds).
e Sources: Revenue projections are from the “Biennial 
Revenue Estimate—83rd Texas Legislature,” Table A-16. 
Expenditure data and projections are from the Texas 
Legislative Budget Board appropriations (all State fiscal 
obligations excluding activity related to trust funds).
f Sources: Commonwealth Data Point for historical revenue 
and expenditures. Projected revenue growth is from 
“General Fund Six-Year Financial Plan” (we assume 4.0 
percent revenue growth in 2014 as the State’s projection 
starts in 2015). Projected expenditure is from other budget 
reports (General and Non-General Funds).
g Population combines historical and projections by State 
from the U.S. Census. The projections are based on the 
2000 Census on 5-year intervals. We calculate population 
for intermediate years using a linear interpolation. The U.S. 
Census does not provide State population projections based 
on the 2010 census.
Table 2 Appendix
To explain the intuition and the nature of our calculations, 
Figure 1 below is a simple partial equilibrium diagram 
that assumes competitive markets, no uncertainty, and 
no adjustment costs. With no price on emissions and no 
abatement, firms optimize their choice of emissions at 
quantity E0. With no efforts at abatement, economic theory 
suggests that the cost of the very first unit of abatement is 
near zero. The simple linear marginal cost of abatement 
(MCA) rises from left to right, but it can also be read from 
right to left as the marginal product of emissions as an input 
to production (since the cost of not emitting a ton is the 
output it could have produced). The federal requirement 
can be converted to a mandated tonnage limit E’, where 
the marginal value is P’, so the “scarcity rents” (profits) are 
the rectangle P’×E’. With tradable permits, the market price 
would be P’, and the handout of permits would provide 
P’×E’ of profits to recipients. Relative to that outcome, the 
state could instead sell the permits and capture the rents – 
raising revenue efficiently with minimum economic costs.
Moreover, the total cost of abatement is the area under the 
MCA from zero to A’. The future price per ton of emissions, 
P’, is highly uncertain, but we provide four kinds of 
calculations and intuition in order to establish the general 
ballpark for that likely future price:
1. The U.S. EPA projects that its clean power plan “Option 
1” may cost $7.4 billion, and it projects total abatement of 383 
million metric tons (MMtons) from 2020 business-as-usual 
levels to reach emissions of 1,777 MMtons in 2020. Since the 
area ($7.4 billion) is one-half the base (383 MMtons) times 
the height, these assumptions yield a height of P’ = $38.6/
ton.
2. States do not start from zero abatement. Several 
Northeastern states participate in the Regional Greenhouse 
Gas Initiative (RGGI). California has its own cap-and-
trade program, and other states have voluntary plans or 
other mandates. For a second simple calculation, suppose 
the marginal cost of abatement is already at the price that 
will apply under the new plan, and that this MCA curve is 
flat from the current amount of abatement to the required 
abatement. Then the cost ($7.4billion) is a rectangle with 
base of 383 MMtons and height of P’=$19.3/ton.
3. Before the President’s plan was announced in June 
2014, Burtraw et al (2014) used a large computer model to 
calculate the possible price per ton under alternative plans. 
The option most similar to the plan analyzed here is their 
national cap-and-trade plan with 400 million short tons of 
abatement, where their projected price is $18/ton.
4. The EPA projected that the permit price under Waxman-
Markey would be from $17 to $22 per metric ton CO2 in 
the year 2020. See United States Environmental Protection 
Agency. (April 20, 2009). EPA Analysis of the Waxman-
Markey Discussion Draft: The American Clean Energy and 
Security Act of 2009. Executive Summary. Available at http://
www.epa.gov/climatechange/Downloads/EPAactivities/
WaxmanMarkeyExecutiveSummary.pdf
For purposes of illustrative calculations above, we focus 
on a price of $20/ton, but we also use a range of prices that 





new emissions:   E’ = E0 __ A’
area = P’ x E’ = total revenue
from carbon tax or cap-and-trade
MCA = Marginal Cost     
              of Abatement
E0
area = total cost of 
abatement 
(e.g. $7.4 billion)
Figure 1: Emissions Quantity, Price, and Marginal Cost of 
Abatement (MCA)
